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A review of the past year's criminal cases reveals few remarkable
departures from prior Texas and federal law as to confessions,
searches, and seizures. Harmless error analysis is still routinely
applied, and both state and federal appellate courts give credence to trial
court fact-findings unless clearly erroneous.
I. CONFESSIONS
A. VOLUNTARINESS
A voluntary, noncustodial statement is exempt from Miranda require-
ments and Texas statutory requirements regarding oral and written state-
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ments of an accused.1 In reviewing the voluntariness of a confession,
appellate courts give almost total deference to the trial court's determina-
tion of historical facts and review the trial court's rulings on the admissi-
bility of the confession using an abuse of discretion standard. Appellate
courts employ a de novo standard of review in reviewing the trial court's
application of the law.2
A statement is involuntary if the totality of the circumstances indicates
that the confessor did not make the decision to confess of his own free
will. Factors such as youth, learning difficulties, emotionalism, or confu-
sion alone will not render a confession inadmissible. 3 Also, "a person's
illiteracy alone will not necessarily render his statement inadmissible."'4
A misrepresentation made by the police to a suspect will not render an
otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible, although it is relevant in as-
sessing whether the suspect made the confession voluntarily.5 Unless cal-
culated to produce an untruthful confession, trickery and deception do
not make a statement involuntary. 6 But police conduct that passes the
line "into the sort of lying that deprives the defendant 'of the knowledge
essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the con-
sequences of abandoning them"' will invalidate a confession. 7
A confession that is the fruit of an illegal arrest "requires suppression
of the confession unless that confession was an act of free will sufficient
to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion."8 In Kaupp v. Texas,
police roused a seventeen-year old suspect from his bed in the middle of a
January night without a warrant or probable cause for his alleged involve-
ment in a murder, telling him, "We need to go and talk." The suspect
answered, "Okay," and the police took the suspect to the police station in
nothing but his boxer shorts and a T-shirt. At the station, the suspect
made an incriminating statement.9 The Supreme Court of the United
States found that that the suspect's answer failed to show consent but
merely constituted acquiescence to police authority. The Court deter-
mined that the confession must be suppressed unless on remand the State
could demonstrate a meaningful intervening event between the illegal ar-
rest and the confession. 10
1. Rodgers v. State, 111 S.W.3d 236, 240 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.).
2. Licon v. State, 99 S.W.3d 918, 924 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2003, no pet.).
3. Id. at 925-26
4. Foster v. State, 101 S.W.3d 490, 497 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.)
5. Hines v. State, No. 14-99-00515-CR, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 6399, at *29 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Jul. 24, 2003, no pet.).
6. Mason v. State, 116 S.W.3d 248, 257 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no
pet.).
7. Hopkins v. Cockrell, 325 F.3d 579, 584 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 430
(2003) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986)).
8. Kaupp v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 1843, 1846 (2003).
9. Id. at 1845.
10. Id. at 1846-47.
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B. CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
A person who is in custody and is subjected to interrogation by law
enforcement officials must be given Miranda warnings. Otherwise, any
statement he makes may not be admissible."1 A person is in custody if "a
reasonable person would believe that his freedom of movement was re-
strained to the degree associated with a formal arrest."'' 2 In determining
whether a person is in custody, the court considers "all of the objective
circumstances of the detention.' 3 Interrogation means either express
questioning or any words or actions that law enforcement officers
"should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. '14
The Miranda warnings (as codified in the Texas Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure Article 38.22) apply only to statements made during custodial in-
terrogation. A voluntary statement which is not the product of custodial
interrogation is not subject to Miranda (or Article 38.22) and is thus ad-
missible at trial. Questioning at the police station does not, in and of
itself, constitute custody.15
The First Court of Appeals in Houston found that questioning a DWI
suspect during a roadside investigation did not constitute custodial inter-
rogation even though the questioning followed failed sobriety tests and
the suspect was in handcuffs during questioning.16 The Fourteenth Court
of Appeals in Houston found that an individual's repeated statements to
a police officer that he did not want to cooperate regarding a videotaped
sobriety test were not made during custodial interrogation where the of-
ficer merely asked the individual to stand on a line while the officer read
something to him. 17
In Xu v. State, the San Antonio Court of Appeals reminded us that an
appellate court must examine all of the objective circumstances surround-
ing a suspect's interrogation to determine whether there was custodial
interrogation. The court considered that the suspect had been at the po-
lice station for five hours, that he was born and lived most of his life in
China where there are no Miranda warnings, that the suspect had a lim-
ited command of the English language, and that he was given only one
bottle of water and one restroom break in this time period-even though
the suspect had been told hours earlier that he was free to leave-in de-
termining that the suspect was subjected to custodial interrogation.1 8
Once a suspect invokes his right to remain silent, interrogation must
cease until counsel is provided unless the suspect reinitiates the conversa-
11. Jones v. State, 119 S.W.3d 766, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
12. Ramirez v. State, 105 S.W.3d 730, 738 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet.)
13. Id.
14. Id. at 740-41 (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)).
15. Rathbun v. State, 96 S.W.3d 563, 565-66 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.)
16. Wappler v. State, 104 S.W.3d 661, 668 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet.
granted).
17. Smith v. State, 105 S.W.3d 203, 208 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet.
ref'd).
18. Xu v. State, 100 S.W.3d 408, 414-15 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. filed).
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tion. In Urias v. State, during tape-recorded police questioning, the de-
fendant asked to stop the interview. The police discontinued taping the
interview but continued to ask the defendant questions resulting in a con-
fession. 19 The El Paso Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in
admitting the statement because it was obtained in violation of his Mi-
randa rights.20
If an individual is not in custody, the "standard requiring termination
of all police interrogation once an attorney is requested is not applica-
ble."'21 The accused reinitiates the conversation where he evinces "a will-
ingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation,"
not "merely a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custo-
dial relationship. '2 2
A valid waiver of Miranda rights requires that the waiver must be vol-
untary-"the product of free and deliberate choice rather than intimida-
tion, coercion, or deception. ' 23 The waiver must also be made knowingly
and intelligently "of the nature of the right being abandoned and the con-
sequences of the decision to abandon it. ' '24 The suspect need not know
every possible consequence of the waiver, nor is it critical for the police
to supply the suspect with a flow of information to help him decide
whether to speak or stand by his rights.2 5 The San Antonio Court of
Appeals found that just because a suspect was unaware of the actual
charges he faced did not mean that he did not knowingly and intelligently
waive his Fifth Amendment rights, and his confession was therefore
admissible. 26
C. STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
In addition to incorporating the Miranda warnings, Article 38.22 of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure sets out additional requirements for a
confession's admissibility. The statute prohibits the admission of oral
statements made by a defendant unless:
(1) the defendant is visually recorded making the statement;
(2) he is given the Miranda warnings;
(3) the recording equipment is operating, the operator is competent,
and the recording is accurate and has not been altered; and
(4) all material voices are identified.27
19. Urias v. State, 104 S.W.3d 578, 581 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2003, pet. granted).
20. Id. at 588.
21. Brossette v. State, 99 S.W.3d 277, 282 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. ref'd, un-
timely filed).
22. Cross v. State, 114 S.W.3d 92, 98 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2003, pet. ref'd).
23. Canady v. State, 100 S.W.3d 28, 29 (Tex. App.-Waco 2003, no pet.)
24. Id. at 29-30.
25. Murphy v. State, 100 S.W.3d 317, 322 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. ref'd),
cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 484 (2003).
26. Id. at 322-23.
27. Brown v. State, 92 S.W.3d 655, 660 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002) (citing TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 (Vernon 1979)), aff'd, 122 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)
cert. denied, No. 03-1078, 72 USLW 3506 (U.S. Tex. Mar. 22, 2004).
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However, when the defendant's statement is the res gestae of the ar-
rest, Section 5 of Article 38.22 permits admission of the unrecorded oral
statement. In Brown v. State, the defendant said, "I'm not going to hurt
you guys. I've already killed everyone I wanted to kill," as police officers
handcuffed him and asked him if he had anything in his pockets. The
Dallas Court of Appeals held that the defendant's statement constituted
the res gestae of the arrest and was admissible even though it was not
recorded.28
But if the accused is not in custody, an electronic recording is not nec-
essary for the admission of oral statements the accused made. The San
Antonio Court of Appeals found that there was no custodial interroga-
tion when a police officer, during a traffic stop, asked an individual if he
had consumed any alcoholic beverages and how many. Thus, the sus-
pect's answer was admissible without a recording. 29
D. JUVENILES
Juveniles must be given statutory admonishments pursuant to the Texas
Family Code before they make a statement or the statement will not be
admissible. But, just as for adults, if the statement is not the product of
custodial interrogation, the statement is admissible even without the stat-
utory admonishments. The courts utilize a "reasonable child" standard in
determining custody-whether "a reasonable child of the same age would
believe his freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated
with a formal arrest" under the objective circumstances. 30 Under the
Family Code, the police must promptly notify the child's parent, guard-
ian, or custodian that the child is in custody and tell him or her why the
child is in custody. But if the police violate the provisions of the Family
Code and obtain a confession from the juvenile, the statement need not
be suppressed unless there is a causal connection between the violation of
Family Code provisions and the juvenile's confession. The Tyler Court of
Appeals found such a causal connection where the police failed to notify
a juvenile's parents about his detention for nine and half hours, and the
juvenile would have had access to his parents if the police had notified
them.31
II. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. IN GENERAL
Texas state courts continue to follow the United States Supreme
Court's lead in search and seizure cases. Such cases are almost always
analyzed in light of the Fourth Amendment, rather than under the Texas
28. Id. at 659-61.
29. Hernandez v. State, 107 S.W.3d 41, 48 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, pet. ref'd).
30. Martinez v. State, No. 04-02-00329-CR, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 8059, at *14-15
(Tex. App.-San Antonio Sept. 17, 2003, no pet.) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.095
(Vernon 2002)).
31. State v. Simpson, 105 S.W.3d 238, 241-43 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2003, no pet.).
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Constitution. In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, both state
and federal appellate courts give great deference to the trial court's deter-
mination of historical facts while reviewing questions of law de novo.32
The Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable search and
seizures extends only to searches involving government action. It does
not apply to a search conducted by a private individual not acting under
the control of or at the request of law enforcement. In Dawson v. State, a
motel manager harbored suspicions that a motel guest was dealing drugs
from his room. The manager invited a police officer, who dropped by the
motel to get a cup of coffee, to accompany him to the room. The man-
ager initiated the entry to check if the room had been abandoned or dam-
aged, since the privacy sign had been on the door for several days, and no
one answered when the manager phoned the room. The officer, standing
outside the threshold of the room, smelled the odor of burnt marijuana,
obtained a search warrant, and found drugs in the room. The First Dis-
trict Court of Appeals in Houston found that the hotel manager was not
acting as an agent of the state since he had a legitimate reason to enter
the room, and the purpose of his entry was to "further his own ends as
the motel manager, not simply to further the State's ends."'33
Not all searches and seizures implicate the Fourth Amendment,34 and
to have standing to contest a search, an individual must have a reasonable
expectation of privacy.35 In order to challenge the admission of evidence
obtained by an allegedly illegal search, the accused must prove (1) that he
had an actual subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) that expectation
of privacy is one that society would recognize as reasonable. 36 Appellate
courts consider the following factors in determining whether an individ-
ual's expectation of privacy is one that society would recognize as
reasonable:
* whether the accused had a property or possessory interest in the
place invaded;
* whether he was legitimately in the place invaded;
* whether he had complete dominion and control and the right to
exclude others;
* whether, before the intrusion, he took normal precautions customa-
rily taken by those seeking to guard their privacy;
* whether he put the place to some private use; and
32. United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 319 F.3d 726, 729 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 123
S. Ct. 2264 (2003); Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
33. Dawson v. State, 106 S.W.3d 388, 392 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no
pet.).
34. United States v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 2003); Ballard v. State,
104 S.W.3d 372, 374 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2003, pet. ref'd).
35. Wilson v. State, 99 S.W.3d 767, 770 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet.
ref'd).
36. Rogers v. State, 113 S.W.3d 452, 457 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.).
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* whether his claim of privacy is consistent with historical notions of
privacy. 37
The San Antonio Court of Appeals found that an individual who took
his computer to a repair shop no longer had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in photo files left on the computer, because he voluntarily relin-
quished control to the shop, he failed to take normal precautions to pro-
tect his privacy, such as removing the files from the computer before
taking it to the shop, and a person generally has no legitimate expectation
of privacy in information voluntarily turned over to third parties.38
A person's expectation of privacy may be subordinate to legitimate
governmental interests, such as inventory searches. The Fourteenth
Court of Appeals in Houston held that there is a diminished expectation
of privacy during emergency medical care. The court found that there is
no Fourth Amendment violation when a hospital performs an inventory
search on a patient's belongings so long as the reason for the search is to
secure and protect the patient's belongings, rather than to discover con-
traband or obtain evidence. 39
The courts reiterated that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
in abandoned property. Property is abandoned if a person intended to
abandon the property and the decision to abandon the property was not
the result of police misconduct. 40 In Swearingen v. State, the defendant's
wife left a note for the landlord of the trailer they were renting, telling
him that they had to move. She also returned both keys to the trailer.
The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the defendant had abandoned
the trailer, and thus had no standing to contest the reasonableness of the
police search of the trailer without a warrant. 41 The First Court of Ap-
peals in Houston found that a suspect abandoned property when he
dropped a bag of narcotics while fleeing the police, so the evidence did
not need to be suppressed as the fruit of an illegal seizure.42 There is also
no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage that is readily accessible
to the public, such as garbage placed in the location for pickup by trash
collectors.43
The Houston Court of Appeals for the First District reiterated that the
use of a drug-dog to sniff for narcotics outside a suspect's house is not a
search. The court distinguished the use of a drug-dog sniff from the use
of a thermal imaging device, which the Supreme Court of the United
States found constituted a search in Kyllo v. United States.44 The court
found that unlike a thermal imaging device, which records the amount of
37. Id.
38. Id. at 458.
39. Wilson, 99 S.W.3d at 770-71.
40. Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
41. Id.
42. Shelley v. State, 101 S.W.3d 606, 611 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet.
ref'd).
43. Nilson v. State, 106 S.W.3d 869, 874 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.).
44. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001).
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heat admitted from a home, a drug-dog sniff does not reveal information
about the interior of a home other than the presence of illegal narcotics.
Thus, it is not a search, and no warrant is required.45
The courts have also addressed the issue of strip searches and body
cavity searches in the past year. The Court of Criminal Appeals found an
officer's visual body cavity search of a suspected drug dealer's buttocks
incident to his arrest was not unreasonable given that officer had proba-
ble cause to believe the suspect was engaged in illegal activity; an inform-
ant told the officer that the suspect was hiding crack cocaine in his
buttocks; the officer was qualified to perform the search; the search was
not violent; and the officer conducted the search at a fire station so as to
protect the suspect's privacy interests. 46 But a strip search without proba-
ble cause to believe a suspect has a weapon, drugs or contraband is un-
reasonably intrusive. 47
The courts also reminded us that there is no expectation of privacy in
blood-alcohol test results taken by hospital personnel solely for medical
purposes, so using a grand jury subpoena to obtain those results does not
constitute an unreasonable search and seizure.48
B. ARREST, STOP, OR INQUIRY WITHOUT WARRANT
There are three distinct types of police-citizen interactions, each requir-
ing a different level of constitutional protection:
" arrests, which require probable cause;
* investigative detentions, which require reasonable suspicion; and
* encounters, which require no objective justification. 49
1. Warrantless Arrests and Searches
In search and seizure law, a home is a sacrosanct place, and one of the
chief evils against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is di-
rected is the warrantless physical entry of the home by government
agents. A search and seizure inside a home is presumptively unreasona-
ble without a search warrant.50 However, one of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement is the exigent circumstances doctrine. Under this
doctrine, the police must have probable cause at the time of the search,
and exigent circumstances must exist that make obtaining a warrant im-
45. Rodriguez v. State, 106 S.W.3d 224, 229-30 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003,
pet. ref'd).
46. McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609, 616-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), cert. denied, 124
S. Ct. 536 (2003).
47. Williams v. Kaufman County, No. 02-10500, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 24763, at *19
(5th Cir. Dec. 9, 2003).
48. Tapp v. State, 108 S.W.3d 459, 462 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet.
ref'd); Garcia v. State, 95 S.W.3d 522, 526-27 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no
pet.).
49. See McCraw v. State, 117 S.W.3d 47, 51-52 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet.
ref'd); see also Gaines v. State, 99 S.W.3d 660, 666 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003,
pet. filed).
50. Estrada v. State, 116 S.W.3d 370, 373 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2003, pet. granted).
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practicable. There must be "'some danger to the officer or victims, an
increased likelihood of apprehending a suspect, or the possible destruc-
tion of evidence."51
In Ramirez v. State, a police officer, investigating a report that Ramirez
was selling marijuana from his garage, smelled fresh marijuana and saw
drug paraphernalia and residue when Ramirez opened the garage door.
The officer requested to pat down one of the other individuals in the
garage, Reynosa, and found a knife and a bag of marijuana. The officer
placed Reynosa under arrest and moved him out of the garage doorway.
The officer also patted down Ramirez, told Ramirez he was being de-
tained, put him in handcuffs, and asked Ramirez if there was any mari-
juana in the garage. Ramirez told him that there might be some
marijuana in a red cooler in the garage. The officer entered the garage to
see if anyone else was there, seized a green pipe and the cooler, searched
the cooler, seized the marijuana he found inside the cooler, and then ap-
plied for a search warrant. 52 The Austin Court of Appeals found that the
search of the cooler was not justified without a warrant because no exi-
gent circumstances existed to search the cooler. Ramirez and Reynosa
posed no reasonable threat to the officer's safety since they were hand-
cuffed and within the officer's control. There was also no possibility that
the marijuana in the cooler would be destroyed because the officer re-
moved the cooler from the garage, and the officer's protective sweep en-
sured that no one remained in the garage.53
Another exception to the warrant requirement is the emergency doc-
trine. In Laney v. State, a sheriff's deputy, responding to a call about a
disturbance between neighbors in a mobile home park, saw two young
boys exit and re-enter Laney's trailer while Laney was being detained in
the deputy's patrol car pending criminal mischief charges. In response to
the deputy's questions, Laney told the deputy that the children were not
his, and that he had been arrested before for indecency with a child.
While one of the boys was outside the trailer, the deputy entered the
trailer to look for the other boy. He found the boy in the back bedroom
and noticed pornographic photographs of young boys engaging in sexual
acts. 54 The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the search was justified
under the emergency doctrine. Although the emergency doctrine is con-
sidered synonymous with the exigent circumstances doctrine, the court
noted that a narrow but critical difference exists between the two doc-
trines. The exigent circumstances doctrine applies when police act in
their crime-fighting role, while the emergency doctrine applies when po-
lice act in a "limited community caretaking role to 'protect or preserve
life or avoid serious injury." 55 The court found that the deputy had an
51. Ramirez v. State, 105 S.W.3d 730, 743 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet.) (quoting
McNairy v. State, 835 S.W.2d 101, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)).
52. Id. at 735-37.
53. Id. at 745.
54. Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
55. Id. at 861 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978)).
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immediate, objectively reasonable belief of a substantial risk of harm to
the boy if he had been left behind while deputies took Laney away, and
the deputy immediately took the boy out of the room without expanding
his search. Thus, the deputy was not required to secure a warrant to
enter and search Laney's residence. 56
The courts also dealt with the Court of Criminal Appeals's holding last
year in State v. Steelman that the odor of marijuana emanating from a
residence alone did not authorize a warrantless search and seizure. 57 In
Effler v. State, officers, responding to a report of unusual odors emanat-
ing from Effler's home, smelled anhydrous ammonia and ether, which are
commonly used in manufacturing methamphetamine. As they ap-
proached the door they heard someone running in the house. A person
identifying himself as a guest in Effler's home answered the door and told
the officers he needed to get Effler's permission to let them in. The guest
then turned around and started running. The officers entered the resi-
dence and apprehended Effler as he was pouring the contents of two one-
gallon jars down the sink. 58 The Eastland Court of Appeals found that
the guest's actions, and the officers' knowledge that the guest was not
alone in the house, created exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless
entry to prevent the destruction of evidence and to protect the personal
safety of the officers. The court distinguished Steelman on the basis that
there was no claim in Steelman of exigent circumstances, and the officers
in Steelman entered the residence to arrest one of its occupants, not to
prevent the destruction of evidence or protect the officer's safety.59
In Estrada v. State, an officer responding to a disturbance call at Es-
trada's grandmother's house heard people running inside when the of-
ficer knocked and identified himself. Initially Estrada did not open the
door. When Estrada finally opened the door, the officer smelled mari-
juana. The officer then entered the house and observed marijuana in sev-
eral places. The El Paso Court of Appeals, relying on Steelman, found
that the evidence that the officer smelled marijuana failed to justify the
warrantless search of the home. 60 The court concluded that just as in
Johnson v. United States,6' (a case the Court of Criminal Appeals relied
on in Steelman), the delay in answering the door and the sounds of people
running inside combined with smell of drugs did not justify a warrantless
entry.62
2. Investigative Detentions (Terry Stops)
Absent probable cause, police may "make a Terry stop and briefly de-
tain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable
56. Id. at 863.
57. State v. Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102, 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
58. Effler v. State, 115 S.W.3d 696, 697-98 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2003, pet. ref'd).
59. Id. at 699.
60. Estrada, 116 S.W.3d at 374.
61. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 12 (1948).
62. Estrada, 116 S.W.3d at 375.
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suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be
afoot."' 63 To justify the detention, the officer's reasonable suspicion must
be based on "specific articulable facts that, in light of the officer's experi-
ence and general knowledge, lead the officer to a reasonable conclusion
that criminal activity is underway and that the detained person is con-
nected with the activity."'64 A police officer may rely on an anonymous
informant's tip so long as the informant's tip bears sufficient indicia of
reliability to justify the detention.65
Appellate courts look at the totality of the circumstances in examining
the reasonableness of an investigative detention.66 The Fifth Circuit reit-
erated that "[t]he reasonableness of the detention depends on (1)
whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and (2) whether
it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place."' 67 In United States v. Brigham, a state
trooper pulled Brigham over for following another car too closely. The
trooper asked Brigham for his driver's license and registration, and Brig-
ham gave the officer his driver's license and rental car contract. The
trooper became suspicious because the rental contract stated that a fifty-
year-old woman had rented the car but she was not present. The trooper
then questioned Brigham and his passengers for about eight minutes
about the purpose of their travel and about the details of their trip. After
this, the trooper radioed Brigham's driver's license information and car
rental information to the dispatcher who responded that the car had not
been reported stolen. 68 The Fifth Circuit found that the officer unreason-
ably and unlawfully prolonged Brigham's detention, violating the Fourth
Amendment, because the eight minutes of questioning were unrelated to
the officer's reasons for stopping Brigham and the officer's concerns
about the discrepancies with the rental contract. 69 The Fifth Circuit has
granted a petition for rehearing en banc in this case.
An investigative detention must not last longer than necessary to sat-
isfy the purpose of the stop. "In other words, once an officer's suspicions
have been dispelled, the detention must end unless there is additional,
articulable, reasonable suspicion."'70 In State v. Kothe, a deputy pulled
Kothe over for driving erratically, suspecting that Kothe was intoxicated.
The deputy conducted a field sobriety check on Kothe and determined
that he was not intoxicated. The deputy then made a dispatch to deter-
mine whether Kothe had any outstanding warrants which came back neg-
63. In re A.T.H., 106 S.W.3d 338, 343 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet.) (quotations
omitted).
64. Sims v. State, 98 S.W.3d 292, 295 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd).
65. Pipkin v. State, 114 S.W.3d 649, 654 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).
66. Sims, 98 S.W.3d at 295; Tasby v. State, 111 S.W.3d 178, 184 (Tex. App.-Eastland
2003, no pet.).
67. United States v. Brigham, 343 F.3d 490, 498 (5th Cir. 2003), reh'g granted, 350 F.3d
1297 (5th Cir. 2003) (quotations omitted).
68. Id. at 494-96.
69. Id. at 505.
70. State v. Kothe, 123 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.).
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ative. Just as the officer was prepared to release Kothe, he received a
teletype that described Kothe, his vehicle, and that the vehicle was carry-
ing a blue bank bag with some antique coins which needed to be confis-
cated. The deputy obtained Kothe's permission to search the vehicle and
discovered drug paraphernalia. 71 The San Antonio Court of Appeals
found that Kothe's continued detention was unreasonable after the dep-
uty determined Kothe was not intoxicated even for the purpose of run-
ning a warrant check.72
The permissible scope and duration of investigatory detentions is often
litigated in the context of border inspections. The Fifth Circuit reminded
us that permanent checkpoints to identify illegal immigrants are constitu-
tional unless the primary purpose is to intercept illegal narcotics. 73 The
stop must be brief-only long enough to determine the citizenship status
of the individuals stopped. The Fifth Circuit found that that an extended
detention violated the Fourth Amendment where a border patrol agent
detained a bus passenger for only three additional minutes in order to
investigate whether the passenger was carrying drugs, because the agent
had already completed his immigration inspection.74 Border patrol
agents may use drug-sniffing dogs at immigration checkpoints only if do-
ing so does not extend the stop beyond the time necessary to verify an
individual's immigration status. If the dog alerts border patrol agents
before that time expires, it may provide sufficient reasonable suspicion to
prolong the stop.75
While nothing in the Fourth Amendment, the Texas Constitution, or
the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States requires a
warrant for the arrest of a person outside of the home, Texas statutory
law generally requires an arrest warrant for an arrest, subject to certain
statutory exceptions. 76 Article 14.03(a)(1) of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure permits warrantless arrests "when officers discover a person in a
suspicious place and under circumstances which reasonably show an of-
fense has been or is about to be committed. ' 77 In Dyar v. State, a suspect
was arrested in a hospital without a warrant for driving while intoxicated.
The suspect had been involved in a one-car accident and taken to the
hospital before law enforcement officers arrived at the accident scene.
The suspect admitted to a state trooper investigating the accident that he
had been drinking alcohol and driving. The trooper observed that the
suspect had slurred speech, red glassy eyes, smelled of alcohol, and an-
71. Id. at 445-46.
72. Id. at 448.
73. See United States v. Ellis, 330 F.3d 677, 680 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Gar-
cia-Garcia, 319 F.3d 726, 729-30 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2264 (2003); United
States v. Portillo-Aguirre, 311 F.3d 647, 655 (5th Cir. 2002).
74. Portillo-Aguirre, 311 F.3d at 656, 658.
75. Garcia-Garcia, 319 F.3d at 730.
76. Dyar v. State, No. 1794-01, 2003 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 74, at *5-7 (Tex. Crim.
App. Apr. 23, 2003) (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 14.03(a)(1)).
77. Id. at *8.
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swered many of the trooper's questions unintelligibly. 78 The Court of
Criminal Appeals, using a totality of the circumstances approach, found
that the hospital was a suspicious place for purposes of the statute, so no
warrant was required. 79
3. Encounters
Even without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, a police officer
may approach an individual in a public place to ask questions or request a
search. Such interactions, known as encounters, require no justification
and trigger no constitutional protections. 80 The Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals noted that "[slo long as the person remains free to disregard the
officer's questions and go about his business, the encounter is consensual
and merits no further constitutional analysis."'81
But an encounter rises to the level of a seizure when a reasonable per-
son believes he is not free to leave and yields to the officer's show of
authority. In Pennywell v. State, a police dispatcher notified a police of-
ficer investigating a burglary at an apartment complex that the suspect
was a black male traveling on foot. The officer noticed Pennywell, a
black male, walking around the gated apartment complex. When the of-
ficer asked Pennywell if he lived there, Pennywell answered that he was
just visiting a friend but was unable to give the friend's name or apart-
ment number. Pennywell was also carrying a bag large enough to contain
a weapon or items taken in a burglary. The officer placed Pennywell in
his patrol car to further investigate the matter. The Fourteenth Court of
Appeals found that the officer's questioning of Pennywell was an encoun-
ter because nothing suggested that Pennywell was not free to answer the
officer's questions. But once the officer placed Pennywell in his patrol
car, the interaction elevated to an investigative detention.82
C. AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF SEARCH WARRANTS
Texas law provides that an application for a search warrant must be
supported by a sworn affidavit which sets forth substantial facts establish-
ing probable cause. 83 There must be sufficient facts in the affidavit for a
magistrate to reasonably conclude that "the object of the search is proba-
bly on the premises."'84 But the magistrate may draw reasonable infer-
ences from the facts and circumstances alleged in the affidavit in
determining whether the facts mentioned in the affidavit are adequate to
78. Id. at *3.
79. Id. at *22.
80. McCraw v. State, 117 S.W.3d 47, 51 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref'd).
81. Id. (citing Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d 227, 235 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)).
82. Pennywell v. State, No. 01-00-01226-CR, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 8931, at *6-7
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 16, 2003, no pet.).
83. Brown v. State, 115 S.W.3d 633, 636 (Tex. App.- Waco 2003, no pet.) (citing TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.01(b) (Vernon 2003)).
84. Lowery v. State, 98 S.W.3d 398, 400 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2003, no pet.).
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establish probable cause.85 Appellate courts determine whether probable
cause existed to issue a search warrant from the four corners of the affi-
davit alone.86
The courts this year addressed the use of information supplied by a
confidential informant' in an affidavit. In Serrano v. State, the affidavit
stated that the affiant, a police officer, received a tip from a confidential
informant that "Daniel Serrano, [a] [H]ispanic male, approximately
[twenty-five] years old, is dealing cocaine in the Austin, Travis County
area."87 The Austin Court of Appeals found that the search warrant was
not supported by probable cause because the affidavit failed to show the
basis of the informant's knowledge. The affidavit neglected to state when
the informant provided the information to police, when the informant
obtained his information, or when the events described in the affidavit
took place.88 And the Amarillo Court of Appeals reiterated that under
the rule of Illinois v. Gates,89 police no longer must establish the credibil-
ity of a confidential informant to establish probable cause. Rather, courts
should determine probable cause from a totality of the circumstances ap-
proach, and the informant's credibility is just one factor to consider.90
Federal law provides a good-faith exception to the probable cause re-
quirement for an affidavit. If an officer's reliance on a warrant is objec-
tively reasonable, but the warrant is later invalidated, the evidence
obtained by the warrant does not have to be suppressed. But if the war-
rant affidavit contains false statements made intentionally or with reck-
less disregard to the truth, the good faith exception will not protect the
evidence from being suppressed. 91 The good-faith exception is statutory
under Texas law, with an additional requirement that the search warrant
must be based on probable cause. 92
-D. CONSENT TO SEARCH
The Court of Criminal Appeals reminded us that a search conducted
with the consent of a suspect is one of the well-delineated exceptions to
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment requirements of a warrant and
probable cause. But the consent must be voluntary, which is determined
from all the circumstances. Under the United States Constitution, the
burden of proving the validity of consent is by a preponderance of the
evidence, while under the Texas Constitution, the burden is by clear and
convincing evidence. 93
85. Id.
86. Serrano v. State, 123 S.W.3d 58, 58 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet.).
87. Id. at 57 (quotations omitted).
88. Id. at 60.
89. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232-33 (1983).
90. Carrillo v. State, 98 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2003, pet. ref'd).
91. United States v. Hinojosa, 349 F.3d 200, 203 (5th Cir. 2003).
92. Long v. State, 108 S.W.3d 424, 429 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2003, pet. granted) (citing
TEX. CODE GRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(b) (Vernon Supp. 2003)).
93. Guevara v. State, 97 S.W.3d 579, 582 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
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Consent must be positive and unequivocal to be valid. In Gallups v.
State, a suspect fled the scene of an accident, leaving his vehicle at the
scene. A witness described the driver of the vehicle to police, and a po-
lice officer went to Gallups' home to investigate the missing driver. The
officer saw Gallups standing inside his home in front of a glass storm
door, and he matched the description given by the witness. The officer
testified that he asked Gallups to come outside, but instead Gallups mo-
tioned with his hand for the officer to come inside.94 The Dallas Court of
Appeals found that this hand motion constituted clear and convincing
evidence of Gallup's positive and unequivocal consent.95 This issue is
currently under review by the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Consent is not voluntary if obtained through duress or coercion. While
courts look at the totality of the circumstances in determining voluntari-
ness, some relevant factors in assessing voluntariness of consent include
(1) the youth, intelligence, and education of the accused; (2) any constitu-
tional advice given to the accused; (3) the length of the detention; (4) the
repetitiveness of the questioning; and (5) the use of physical punish-
ment.96 But a police officer's failure to tell the accused that he can refuse
to consent does not automatically invalidate consent. 97 And the fact that
a police officer states that he can get a search warrant if an individual
refuses to consent does not render consent involuntary. 98
Once a person consents to a search, the police's authority to search is
limited to the scope of the consent.99 In United States v. Mendoza-Gon-
zalez, a border patrol agent asked to take a look inside of a truck driver's
trailer at a permanent immigration checkpoint. The driver consented.
While most of the cargo in the trailer was in white boxes, wrapped in
cellophane, and on pallets, the agent noticed some brown cardboard
boxes sitting on top of the cargo. The agent opened one of the brown
boxes, saw some rectangular bundles inside, which he recognized as mari-
juana bricks, and then cut open one of the bricks to reveal marijuana. 100
The Fifth Circuit found that the agent did not exceed the scope of the
consent because Mendoza failed to place any explicit limitations on the
agent's search. The defendant has the responsibility to limit the search,
and the officer was not required to obtain separate consent for each
container within a vehicle that he had been granted consent to search. 101
The courts also addressed the issue of third party consent this year. If a
third party has joint access and control over the property and consents to
the search, then a warrantless search of the property does not violate the
94. Gallups v. State, 104 S.W.3d 361, 364-65 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. granted).
95. Id. at 368.
96. State v. Hunter, 102 S.W.3d 306, 311 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).
97. Id.
98. Bellaire v. State, 110 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet.
ref'd).
99. United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 318 F.3d 663, 666-67 (5th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 2114 (2003).
100. Id. at 665.
101. Id. at 667.
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Fourth Amendment. Even if the third party does not have actual author-
ity over the premises, the consent is still valid if the third party has appar-
ent authority. In Whisenhunt v. State, Whisenhunt was out of town when
his home was burglarized. His roommate reported the burglary to the
police. When a police officer came to the home to investigate the bur-
glary, the roommate told the officer that Whisenhunt owned the home
and was out of town. The roommate showed the officer around, explain-
ing that the home had been ransacked but that he was not sure what, if
anything, had been taken from Whisenhunt's room. The officer entered
Whisenhunt's room and found marijuana in a jewelry box that he was
dusting for fingerprints. 10 2 The Houston Court of Appeals, First District,
found that it was reasonable for the officer to conclude that the room-
mate had apparent authority to consent to the search, and that the room-
mate consented to a search of Whisenhunt's room.10 3 And in United
States v. Shelton, the Fifth Circuit found that the defendant's estranged
wife possessed common authority to consent to a search of a house that
they had shared for the last six years, even though she had no ownership
in the house and she was not living in the house at the time of the search
because they were separated.'0 4 The defendant had taken no action to
restrict his spouse's access to the house and thus had no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy where she was concerned.10 5
E. MISCELLANEOUS CASES
Courts also addressed the following issues this year:
* Police authority to conduct an investigative detention outside their
jurisdiction: Under the "hot pursuit" doctrine, police officers have
the authority to detain a suspect outside their jurisdiction if the ini-
tial pursuit is lawfully initiated on the ground of suspicion arising
within the police's geographic boundary, and there is an immediate
and continuous pursuit of the suspect from the scene of a crime.106
The Dallas Court of Appeals, citing the Court of Criminal Appeals'
holding in Yeager v. State, interpreted this to mean that an officer
lacks authority to conduct an investigative detention outside the ge-
ographic boundaries of the officer's jurisdiction if reasonable suspi-
cion does not arise within his jurisdiction. This issue is currently
under review by the Court of Criminal Appeals.107
* The knock-and-announce rule: The Fifth Circuit reiterated that
there is no "blanket rule that police are never required to knock-
and-announce when executing a warrant for a drug investiga-
102. Whisenhunt v. State, No. 01-02-00660-CR2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 7764, at *2-3
(Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] Aug. 29, 2003, no pet.).
103. Id. at *16.
104. United States v. Shelton, 337 F.3d 529, 534, 538 (5th Cir. 2003).
105. Id. at 537.
106. Yeager v. State, 104 S.W.3d 103, 107-09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
107. State v. Kurtz, 111 S.W.3d 315, 322-23 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. granted) (cit-
ing Yeager, 104 S.W.3d at 107).
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tion";108 rather, police must have a reasonable suspicion that, under
the particular circumstances the drugs will be readily destroyed or
announcing their presence will endanger their safety. 10 9
Seizure of persons: Police observation of a suspect in public, even if
it is intimidating, does not constitute a seizure of that suspect. 110
III. CONCLUSION
A review of the past year's cases regarding confessions, searches, and
seizures reveals not only reiteration of well-established precedent in these
areas but also new and important interpretations of that precedent. State
courts tend to analyze these issues under the Fourth Amendment unless
Texas statutes impose different requirements. And, because of the fed-
eral constitutional issues involved, there is much overlap between state
and federal cases. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and the Fifth
Circuit have granted review on several courts of appeals's decisions in
these areas, so it will be interesting to see how the courts resolve these
issues.
108. United States v. Washington, 340 F.3d 222, 226 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 157 L.
Ed. 2d 757 (U.S. 2003).
109. Id.; Haley v. State, 113 S.W.3d 801, 807 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, pet. filed); Marsh
v. State, 115 S.W.3d 709, 713 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet.); Ballard v. State, 104
S.W.3d 372, 376 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2003, pet. ref'd).
110. United States v. Mask, 330 F.3d 330, 337-38 (5th Cir. 2003).
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